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Abstract
This article examines how the birth and the development of regional
systems of innovation are connected with economic selection and points
to implications for regional-level policies. The research questions are ex-
plored using an evolutionary model, which emphasises geographical spaces
and production of intermediate goods. In particular we are concerned with
how cooperative behaviour of technology producers is a¤ected by the need
to protect technological secrecies and of being nancially constrained by
rms demanding innovative input. Based on the theoretical model, we
provide an analysis using computer simulations. The primary ndings are,
rstly, that the model generates predictions suited for empirical research
on how economic selection inuences cooperative behaviour of innovative
actors. Secondly, we demonstrate how a regions entrepreneurial activity
and growth can be controlled in a decentralised way by regions
Keywords: Regional system of innovation, intermediate goods, eco-
nomic selection, organisational capital
JEL Classication: L24 O33 R38
1 Introduction
In the Nelson-Winter evolutionary model, innovations depend on R&D expen-
ditures, which grow and decline with the growth and decline of rms (Nelson
& Winter 1982). This approach does not fully take into account recent insights
into the organisation of the innovative process mainly provided by geographers
(Cooke & Morgan 1998; Saxenian 1994; Scott 2000; Storper 1997). The in-
clusion of geographical spaces improves the organisation-theoretic foundation
of the evolutionary model in di¤erent ways. An extended model takes account
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of the vertical disintegration of large rms and the production of intermediate
goods.
In this paper we focus on the production of innovative input within re-
gional systems of innovation, which join together infrastructure (in particular
knowledge infrastructures such as universities and R&D facilities) and innov-
ative behavior (Werker & Athreye 2004). Many studies of regional innovation
systems are motivated by beliefs that the relation between technical advance
and regional growth depends on the amount of technological knowledge in a
region. Yet, the connections between the body of knowledge and the knowledge
that is economically exploitable (economic knowledge) are awkward, which has
been discussed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) and more recently by Audretsch
and Keilbach (2004). Cantner and Graf (2004) focus on e¢ cient organisation
of knowledge creation in regions and nd that regions that are technologically
moderately specialised with regard to kind of knowledge and degree of sophis-
tication show the highest number of research cooperations. Their approach is
inspiring, but they have no explicit reference to economic selection. In the fol-
lowing, we try to introduce geography in an evolutionary model and, at the
same time, examine questions of how Cantner and Grafs analysis of regional
innovation systems can be connected with Audretsch and Keilbachs approach
to economic selection.
We note that the Lisbon Strategy launched by the EU raises interesting
policy questions about connections between technical advance and regional dif-
ferences in growth. For a long time, it appeared as if the European regions
converged, but more recent evidence challenges this perception (Cappelen et
al. 2003). The notion of a regional system of innovation incorporates policy
variables (institutions for higher education, technology advisory centres), which
in part are controlled through regional-level policies. Inquiries into this system
may improve the understanding of decentralised (regional) approaches to the re-
alisation of the Lisbon Strategy. The primary aim of this paper is to examine if
evolutionary modelling, which highlights relations between geographical spaces,
regional systems of innovation and competitive selection, generates patterns
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with empirical relevance for research on regional involvement in EU technology
policies on regional growth. Inspired by recent discussions about improvements
of the rst generation of Nelson-Winter models (Malerba et al. 1999; Sloth An-
dersen 2001), we thus propose an evolutionary model and a computer simulation
program for logical exploration of causal relations that, hopefully, will improve
the arguments put forward in future empirical research.
The rst nding of our study indicates that an evolutionary model that ad-
mits production of intermediate goods provides insights into how regional sys-
tems of innovations are born and develop. In vertically disintegrated production
systems, the technology producers perceive a need to protect technological se-
crecies and they are nancially constrained by the demand for innovative input
by downstream rms. With reasonable assumptions about these perceptions
and conditions, our simulations produce sensible development paths for the sys-
tem of innovation. The second nding suggests that the development path can
be controlled in a decentralised way by regions that take actions to a¤ect the
interaction between technology producers; either by changing the degree of spe-
cialisation or by an exemplary model - a key entrepreneur - who perceives market
needs and initiates business opportunities. If a regional policy-maker takes these
actions to create favorable conditions for cooperative behavior within a region,
it will usually help the nance of the entrepreneurial activity and the growth of
the same region. However, the simulations made for this paper suggest that a
zero-sum game is going on between the regions unless the regional-level policies
are coordinated with the knowledge management strategies of large rms (with
a¢ liations in di¤erent regions).
Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the evolutionary model we use to
explore our research questions. Production of intermediate goods is included
through the regional system of innovation, which produces and sells new tech-
nology to rms in the region (national rms) or to rms with a¢ liations in dif-
ferent regions. These rms invest in facilities to produce for product markets.
Section 3 describes how the model is applied to illuminate issues on regional
involvement in policy-making. Here we show how our approach for examining
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cooperative behavior of innovative actors di¤ers from research on innovative
behavior based on specialisation. The simulations are reported in section 4,
which also includes appropriate interpretations. Section 5, nally, contains a
few concluding remarks.
2 The model1
The geographic dimension of evolutionary modelling is seen through the lens
of vertical disintegration and production of intermediate goods. It is also built
on the work of Audretsch and Keilbach (2004), who argue that the selection of
economic knowledge from the whole body of knowledge is the result of entre-
preneurs, who increase regional growth by starting new rms. They argue that
entrepreneurs place a high value on knowledge, which is not valued as highly
by hierarchical decision making organisations in incumbent rms. Entrepre-
neurs start new rms to appropriate this value. This perspective is broadened
in our paper, rstly, by separating knowledge in national rms, which develop
by learning in regional spaces, from knowledge in multinational rms (MNEs)
unfolding by learning in supra-regional spaces. It is an urgent task to describe
the implications for innovative behavior of a larger capacity of MNEs to develop,
orchestrate and integrate a wide variety of technological knowledge. Secondly,
the perspective is broadened as the entrepreneurs also rely on technological
knowledge created in regional innovation systems.
Our approach emphasises changes in the industrial structure due to vertical
disintegration of large rms leading to increased growth of a small business
sector (cf. Carree & Thurik 1999). This approach is in the spirit of scholars
arguing that the so-called new growth theory is unable to explain why large
investments in R&D do not always result in rapid economic growth (Carlsson
et.al. 2007). By neglecting the di¤erence between economic knowledge and the
whole body of knowledge, this theory do not only disregard the importance of
the "knowledge lter" preventing knowledge from becoming economically useful,
1For a complete description of our model, please contact the authors.
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but it also neglects entrepreneurship that converts economic relevant knowledge
to economic activity. In our paper, we deal with entrepreneurship by noting a
new kind of technological regime, where the translation of basic research into
commercial knowledge is carried out by small rms in industries with a large
share of large rms (see Carlsson et.al. 2007 for more details about this regime).
Stable states of small rms are contradictory to belief that small rms are
ine¢ cient and therefore are eliminated by competitive selection. But, as Carree
and Thurik (1999) conclude, small rms can compensate for cost disadvantages
by creating networks or other inter-rm linkages. From this perspective, entries
into and exits from a small business sector can be seen as changes in regional
systems of innovation. This sector develops new technology for technology mar-
kets and the producers become patent-holders and sell patents and licences to
other rms, which invest in new facilities to produce for product markets.
Literature on industrial districts argues that social networks constitute the
foundation required for the creation of business-oriented regional networks (Lech-
ner & Dowling 1999). Regional networks constitute the small business element
of an innovation system. The institutional set-up (infrastructure) of a region
a¤ects opportunities for mobilising pockets of available resources in the social
network, which depends on the presence of a key entrepreneur or scientist (Lech-
ner & Dowling 1999; Gerybadze 1998; Sternberg 1996). In our model, there is
one key entrepreneur in each region, who initiates business opportunities. The
inventors start to learn about a business opportunity when the key entrepreneur
"perceive(s) a market need" (Kline & Rosenberg 1986, p. 289). The conditions
for learning about new interests are favorable when the individuals share a
common professional background (Checkel 2001), i.e. the chance for a regional
network to appear within the social network is good.
In the spirit of DeCanio and Watkins (1998), we imagine an inventor as
persuaded to participate in the development of a business opportunity. The
probability of him/her joining a business-oriented regional network increases if
the number of colleagues in the social network he or she is connected with, who
argue in favour of the business opportunity, is su¢ cient. Before he/she becomes
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an advocate of a business opportunity, the di¤erent aspects of the opportunity
must be understood and information received from colleagues must be digested
thoroughly. This requires the use of information-processing capacity, which
is limited for the individual inventor (this kind of limitation is fully explored
by Simon, 1981). Di¢ culties with dense social networks are also discussed by
Burt (1992), who points to redundant contacts, which lead to the same people
and, thus, provide the same messages. The most favorable conditions for the
creation of regional networks are associated with multiple agents competing for
the occupation of structural holes, which connect non-redundant contacts.
Drawing on De Canio and Watkins, we suggest the following relationship
between the probability for an inventor to individually consider a business op-
portunity, his or her information processing capability and the structure of the
social network:
P gi (d
g
i (t) = 1) =
1
1 + e
  [
x
g
i
(t)  1
2
]
2
2
  1
1 + e
1
2
; (1)
where P gi is the probability for an inventor i in region g to consider a business
opportunity, and dgi (t) is a random variable with either the value of one or zero,
according to whether the inventor does or does not consider the opportunity.
While 1 and 2 are constants, 2 is a parameter introduced to represent the
processing power. Furthermore,
xgi (t) =
P
l Y
g
il (t)
Zgi (t)
: (2)
Y gil (t) = 1 if inventor i is connected to inventor l (in the sense that he or
she is informed about ls situation) and l considers the business opportunity at
t: Y gil (t) = 0 if the inventor is connected to l, but the latter does not consider
the business opportunity. Zgi (t) is the total number of inventors inventor i is
connected to. An inventor with a large number of contacts with other members
of the social network is unable to digest all information he or she receives. Since
a business opportunity will not be considered, information will not be di¤used,
impeding the development of the regional network.
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The structure of the social network changes over time (new contacts are
established and old ones are broken). The establishment of new contacts at t
depends on the interaction between inventors and on the chance that the inter-
action will lead to a contact. The chance varies between regions according to, for
instance, the degree of specialisation. The number of meetings of i and l at each
point in time - nil - is associated with infrastructures that orchestrate the di-
alogues among technical workers (e.g., technology information centres, regional
science and technology societies, supplementary education). The probability
that i and l will exchange information at a meeting - pil - depends on variation
in knowledge and sophistication among the technology producers. The proba-
bility for a meeting between two inventors to lead to exchange of information
is high, if they perceive their competencies as equal, and low in other cases.
In addition, high probability requires that the kinds of knowledge held by the
inventors are complements rather than substitutes.2 h refers to the minimum
number of meetings, where information has been exchanged between i and l,
required to establish a contact. Moreover, t0 is the point in time when inventors
i and l begin to establish connections after social contacts have been broken or
when a business opportunity last failed for i or l . t0 = 0, if i and l have never
broken a contact or been involved in a business opportunity.
The sequences of meetings are considered independent Bernoulli trials, i.e.
for nil(t  t0)  h the probability for a contact to establish between inventors i
and l in region g at t is determined by the binomial formula:
P gil(Z
g
il(t) = 1) =
(nil)(t t0)X
r=h

(nil)(t  t0)
r

(pil)
r(1  pil)(nil)(t t0) r: (3)
If nil(t  t0) < h, then P gil(Zgil(t) = 1) = 0:
The technological knowledge in a region derives from di¤erent sources: 1)
from inventor activities within the region, 2) from spill over received from other
regions and 3) from knowledge channelled through multinational enterprises
2This pattern of variation in pil is dened in the spirit of Cantner & Graf (2004), who
consider the probability of cooperation as dependent on kind of knowledge and on the degree
of sophistication.
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(MNEs). Technology from 3) crosses supra-regional spaces within the organisa-
tional spheres of MNEs. By calling attention to this source, we want to empha-
sise the importance of knowledge management by MNEs. While 1) and 2) pro-
vide public knowledge, knowledge from 3) depends on how MNEs link corporate
strategies with changes in the organisational capital which is technological in-
formation that belongs to the rms. By suitable knowledge management, MNEs
gain from geographic specialisation and from the ability to orchestrate supra-
regional technology di¤usion and, thereby, achieve competitive advantages over
national rms. At the same time, they master "information stickiness", which
our model treats as a barrier to 2) ("spill over received from other regions").3
Inspired by Weitzman (1998), we consider the research process to be recom-
binations of old ideas in new ways to create new ideas. Consequently, technolog-
ical knowledge can be measured as all possible combinations of product specic
knowledge. If sg represents the number of product models produced in region
g, then 2s
g
represents the number of all possible subset combinations (including
the null set) that can be formed out of the product specic knowledge in g (cf.
Weitzman 1998).
The di¤usion of a technology starts with an invention leading to a new prod-
uct model, which afterwards induces a series of additional innovations based on
the same technology. Our model depicts the di¤usion of product models in-
vented and produced in two regions (g and g), and supplied in one market.
The technology gap between the regions can be measured as 2s
g   2sg , where
sg

> sg. Due to "stickiness", only a portion (1) of the di¤erence in techno-
logical knowledge is transferred from g to g external of the MNEs. Moreover,
the ability to interpret and to understand information received (the absorptive
capability) in g decreases when the gap between the regions increases. Thus,
the net spill over between regions g and g, which is not channelled through
MNEs, is
Hg
g(t) = 2
sg(t)+
1[sg

(t) sg(t)]
2 e [s
g (t) sg(t)]   2sg(t) : (4)
3An interesting discussion of "information stickiness" is found in von Hippel (1998).
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The rst term to the right of the equity sign shows the technological knowl-
edge available in g, when the spill over is included. However, due to less absorp-
tive capability in g, only part of the technology spill over can be recombined
with new ideas, which is taken into account by the expression in the denomina-
tor. The spill over between the two regions is found after the knowledge deriving
from the inventor activity in the lagging region (the second term to the right of
the equity sign) has been subtracted.
MNEs are net-worked in both regions, and information is collected and redis-
tributed through internal systems for information and knowledge management.
Accordingly, all employees in a MNE have access to the same information and
the same number of recombinations of old ideas can be formed (2s
g
).
We may think about the coupling between a regional innovation system
and economic selection as preliminary designs, proposed by inventors working
together, and examined by rms balancing technical problems and market gains.
The probability for an innovation at time t depends on expectations about rm-
growth, which vary with changes in the rate of growth of the common market.
Whether an innovation derives from inventor activities in region g or in g
depends on the probability for nding solutions to technical problems, which
increases with the number of combinations of product specic knowledge and
with the capacity to process information in the respective regions.
After the decision to innovate has been made, the rm has to decide about
the location of production. MNEs can fully gain from geographical specialisa-
tion, while national enterprises (NEs) sometimes are facing a trade-o¤ between
low production costs and access to innovative input. In our model, production
costs depend on a spill over parameter expressing the proportion of technolog-
ical knowledge spilling over from experience accumulated in the production of
less advanced goods.4
4The value of the parameter depends on the rate of qualitative changes from one product
variant to another and on the number of types of product-specic knowledge transferred. A
wide range of product-specic knowledge requires a large labour market for the recruitment
of qualied employees ("economies of a pooled labour force"). The more properties of prior
products incorporated in a new product, the more sensitive are the productions costs.
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New product variants enter into the market; products produced above aver-
age e¢ ciency extend their market shares and below average products lose market
shares and sometimes exit from the market. The epidemic model of technology
di¤usion is applied to depict this evolutionary process through which economic
selection proceeds. The di¤usion process is described by a complex equation,
which is illustrated by the following simple logistic function
dmsj (t)
dt
=  (n msj (t)) ms
j (t)
n
; (5)
where the total number of potential users of a product model, n, is given
beforehand. Moreover, msj (t) is the number of users of product model sj at
date t, and  is the rate of di¤usion. This is a disequilibrium approach, where
the process is self-perpetuating: the use of a product is initiated through con-
tacts between users and non-users, which leads to further use. The marketing
literature commonly includes external sources of information, such as advertis-
ing, implying that the di¤usion process no longer is completely self-propagating
(see Stoneman, 2002). No position is taken on which type of external inter-
vention the rms use, but we assume that the resources they have for external
interventions depend on economic performance.
In our model, management does not know the thorough production costs
before entering into the market. This idea is discussed by Jovanovic (1982), who
assumes that rms learn about their production costs after starting production.
In our model, no entrant knows the true costs, which is a random draw from a
normal distribution of costs. Firms making favorable draws can a¤ord low prices
and e¢ cient marketing. Our approach to competitive selection also notes that a
new product o¤ers improved quality or performance as compared with an older
product, which could a¤ect demand across products. These interrelationships
between products are taken into account in the sense that a user of product sj
may substitute this product for another product si.
Economies of scale explain why young rms exit from an industry (Audretsch
1995). In our model, a product model remains on the market throughout its
exploratory stage (products younger than t) and there are expectations that
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the minimum e¢ cient plant-size (ms) will be attained in this stage. Thus, no
product model is eliminated from the market during the exploratory stage. For
product models of age t and older, the following condition is valid for exit5 :
mssj (t) < ms
 ; t  t;
where the number of users (msj (t)) has been replaced by the market share
(mssj (t)).
3 Empirical challenges
One question arising is if evolutionary modelling with a geographic dimension
generates patterns with empirical relevance. To answer this question, we draw
attention to the EUs Lisbon Strategy, which is supposed to make Europe the
most competitive knowledge based economy in the world by 2010.6 In addressing
the regional dimension of the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission connects regional
disparities in research, innovation and economic growth to Europes capacity to
stay competitive in world markets. Regions are expected to play a "motor"
role in the overall context of economic growth, and the achievement of greater
cohesion in the EU depends on "the integration of research capabilities in less
favoured regions in the European research fabric".7
Obviously, more recently the EU Commission has overridden the regional
dimension by the globalisation perspective. This is a response to the fact that
new scientic and technological powers (China and India) have become attrac-
tive for business as a location for R&D investments.8 Contrary to the seem-
ingly devaluation of regional equalisation by the Commission, our simulation
5Empirical evidence shows that both small and large rms disappear from the market after
the di¤usion of a new technology has culminated; economies of scale, thus, is not an important
aspect of high exit rates. Therefore, this condition will be reformulated in future research (cf.
Gort & Klepper 1982).
6Facing the challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment. Report from the
High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, 2004
7Communication from the Commission. The regional Dimension of the European Research
Area, COM(2001) 549 nal, Commission of the European Communities pp. 5 and 18
8Green Paper, The European Research Area: New Perspectives, COM(2007) 161 nal,
Commission of the European Communities
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model is constructed to address issues on how innovation systems can be used
to reduce regional imbalances. This paper, however, focuses on understanding
decentralised (regional) approaches to the realisation of the Lisbon Strategy.
That is, it is expected to improve the "region-conscious" development model for
the organisation of European research, which the EU Commission suggested at
an early stage. Since the regions have di¤erent proles, the Commission advo-
cates the reliance on "the self-organising capacity of regions" which it considers
a growth factor, and on "territorialisation" implying a "tailor-made" research
policy approach that addresses specic territorial conditions.9
This can be done because our model admits that the selection of technological
designs produced in a region becomes more probable when the amount of knowl-
edge and the research capability of the regional innovation system increase. In
addition, the research capability increases with the size of the regional network,
which agrees with Cantner and Graf (2004, p. 544), who argue that "coopera-
tion is favorable to innovation". This conclusion is crucial for our study, where
it is claimed that the size of regional networks can be a¤ected by regional-level
politics. It also sets for a discussion of a strategy for the satisfaction of what the
EU Commission denes as a need to overcome the fragmentation of the Euro-
pean research base. Overcoming this fragmentation is believed to help regions
to "attract a critical mass of human and nancial resources from across the
world". We doubt, however, the conclusion drawn by the Commission that con-
centration and specialisation is necessary to permit the emergence of one group
of European centres of excellence and another group of centres which excel in
addressing research and training at the national, regional and sectorial levels.10
We suggest a method to examine if the critical mass can be attracted within
the context of the new development model and without regional imbalances.
One implication of vertical disintegration and production of intermediate
goods is that large rms may put limitations on the regional research capability.
9Communication from the Commission. The regional Dimension of the European Research
Area, COM(2001) 549 nal, Commission of the European Communities pp. 6 and 7
10Green Paper, The European Research Area: New Perspectives, COM(2007) 161 nal,
Commission of the European Communities, pp. 8 and 14
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They may be reluctant to share technological knowledge with external produc-
ers of technology. The EU Commission concludes that achieving the Lisbon
objectives is facilitated by regional strategies encouraging "dynamic operators
coming together in partnerships", but businesses nd it di¢ cult to cooperate
and to enter into partnership with European research institutions.11 According
to the Commission, these di¢ culties may depend on businesses that invest in
R&D look for adequate numbers of well-trained and mobile researchers and an
excellent public research base.12
MNEs are not willing to share knowledge that is highly valued by their
hierarchical decision making organisations (cf. section 2). Furthermore, the
research capability of the regional systems of innovation is changed if the MNEs
revaluate technological knowledge. This revaluation implies, for instance, that
transferable knowledge about products is transformed to organisational capital
which belongs to the rm. Our model spells out the spatial implications of this
transformation, which favours the di¤usion of advanced technology within an
elite of engineers and scientists organised by the headquarters of the MNEs.
This elite can be found both in technologically advanced and in lagging regions.
At the same time, the technology spill over from the advanced regions to all
other technology producers in the lagging regions is reduced. This paper also
reports applications of the simulation model that examine how the cooperative
behavior of businesses changes with regional system improvements produced
by the regional authorities. We imagine the role of regional level policies as a
task to a¤ect the context for decision making by technology producers. More
specically, this task is to regulate the exchange relations and to orchestrate
the reasoning patterns and the dialogues. As Saxenian (1994) points out in
her study of cooperative behavior in Silicon Valley, public forums encourage
the development of shared understanding, foster collective identities and trust
11Communication from the Commission. The regional Dimension of the European Research
Area, COM(2001) 549 nal, Commission of the European Communities, p 8 and Green Paper,
The European Research Area: New Perspectives, COM(2007) 161 nal, Commission of the
European Communities, p 6
12Green Paper, The European Research Area: New Perspectives, COM(2007) 161 nal,
Commission of the European Communities, p 7
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to support the formation of local networks, and, thus, promote collaboration
among local producers.
It has been argued that income per capita will converge among regions with
homogenous infrastructures (cf. Caniëls & Verspagen 2001). In our model,
production of intermediate goods takes place in regional systems of innovation,
which have an institutional set-up of infrastructures (cf. section 1). There-
fore, simulations based on this model can provide insight into how investments
in infrastructures a¤ect cohesion in Europe. More specically, they indicate
how regional di¤erences in growth can be moderated at the regional level by
policy-makers, who use the institutional set-up to a¤ect interactions between
technology producers.
Interaction among producers of technology is discussed by Cantner and Graf
(2004), who nd that regions that are technologically moderately specialised
show the highest number of research cooperations. In addition, the more spe-
cialised a region is, the more cooperation takes place inside the region as com-
pared with partners in other regions. Cantner and Grafs empirical research is
not questioned here, but we try to improve their empirical predictions with the
introduction of more factors explaining cooperative behavior. They consider
cooperation in the context of positions technical workers have in a technology
structure and nd that the probability for cooperation depends on the degree
to which exchange of knowledge is benecial to all sides involved. Benets are
associated with properties of the technology embedded in people (kind of knowl-
edge and sophistication). We try to extend this view of cooperation to cover
situations where the behavior of the technology producers also depends on their
position as producers of intermediate goods. When advancing their commercial
interests in the innovative process, technical workers probably feel a need to
protect technological secrecies and there is reason to believe that this behavior
inuences research cooperation. A second type of feedback, working back from
economic selection, on cooperative behavior is a nancial constraint, which de-
pends on the demand for innovative input by downstream producers. In the
following, these two types of feedback will be examined through the lens of our
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simulation model.
4 Analysis using simulations
4.1 Cooperative behavior
The introduction to this paper mentions the goal of connecting Cantner and
Grafs analysis of local innovation systems with Audretsch and Keilbachs ap-
proach to economic selection. Lechner and Dowling (1999) argue that the net-
works of innovators tend to be isolated when economic selection proceeds, which
leads to decreased innovativeness. The inventors who survive believe that their
success is not linked to the networks they have created. This tendency towards
isolation is considered in our model, but our interpretation is that the inven-
tors involved in industrial research are concerned about how to advance their
technological designs in markets for technology. They believe there is a risk
of imitation. Accordingly, inventors, who are alert to business opportunities,
worry about how to protect the technology they develop. When they consider
a business opportunity, and connections are established within the regional net-
work, they try to keep technological knowledge secret. Social contacts with
inventors, who are not involved in the advancement of the business opportunity,
are broken with a certain probability and for a certain period of time (= 1 time
step). After this period, new social contacts will be established according to the
model presented in section 2. While the key entrepreneur is the only inventor
who considers business opportunities all the time, he or she never breaks a social
contact.
Lack of nance is also a feedback working back from economic selection,
which inhibits the development of a business opportunity within a regional in-
novation system. In recognising that the average holding-period for a venture
capital investment is less than ve years (Berglöf 1994), we assume that a busi-
ness opportunity, to survive, must be rewarded by an innovation within ve
years. Thus, the technology producers follow a simple rule that a regional
network that turns out badly (i.e. is not rewarded with innovations), is termi-
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nated after ve years. After a business opportunity has failed, the inventors
lose prestige in the eyes of colleagues with whom they have no social contacts.
The probability for establishing contacts with the failing inventors is reduced
to zero. Afterwards, the probability grows according to the model in section
2. On the other hand, social contacts between the inventors who shared the
business opportunity will be unchanged, as well as all social contacts of the key
entrepreneur.
The empirical predictions of our model cannot be directly measured against
the results obtained by Cantner and Graf. We claim that the degree of speciali-
sation (in terms of whether the knowledge of the technology producers comple-
ments or substitutes or di¤ers in sophistication) determines the probability that
two inventors will exchange information at a meeting (pil). In the spirit of Cant-
ner and Graf, we associate a moderate specialisation with a high probability and
a low or high level of specialisation is associated with low probability. That is,
our inquiry into a decentralised approach to EU governance raises the question
of whether the goals of the EU concerning e¢ cient production of advanced tech-
nology and economic growth can be achieved by regional-level policies, which
try to increase pil by seeking to attain moderate specialisation.
Our answer to this question is based on properties of the model concern-
ing the establishment of new contacts within the social network. It is claimed
that the regional authorities can inuence the number of meetings among tech-
nical workers - nil - through the launching of technology information centres,
regional science and technology societies as well as through the provision of sup-
plementary education. However, specialisation is a property of the purpose of
the meetings, which concerns the type and specicity of the knowledge created.
Thus, in this paper, infrastructural policies a¤ecting the number of meetings
will be held constant (nil is xed). Instead regional policies on the composition
of expertise and counselling delivered by technology societies and information
and education centres will be emphasised.
Figure 1 depicts results from our simulations, where the e¤ects of these poli-
cies on the cooperative behavior within regional innovation systems are easily
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imagined. No matter at which stage of the industry life-cycle competitive selec-
tion is, the regional network density increases with pil. In recognising the steep
increase in density at t = 40, we must admit that the relatively slow develop-
ment of research cooperation in the beginning of the cycle depends on inventor
protection. Early formation of innovative contacts in the regional network im-
plies that contacts in the social network are broken, which has a retarding e¤ect
on cooperative behavior. Figure 1 also emphasises the inuence of economic
selection later on in the industrial life cycle, where the gure becomes "hon-
eycombed". These irregularities predict a tendency towards downsizing of the
social network and research cooperation that derive from di¢ culties the actors
in the innovation system have nancing their cooperation. When the market
for nal products becomes saturated at t = 80, the growth of the rms stag-
nates with a negative e¤ect on the number of innovations. The demand for
intermediate goods (innovative input) stagnates, which hurts cooperation.
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Another result supports ndings that networks depend on the presence of a
key entrepreneur (Lechner & Dowling 1999; Gerybadze 1998; Sternberg 1996).
One of the technology producers plays a missionary role in the model (the key
entrepreneur, who considers business opportunities all the time) and thus has no
interest in breaking contacts in the social network. Accordingly, he or she is more
alert to establishing innovative relations than are the other inventors (gure 2).
A comparison of gures 1 and 2 suggests that the major part of the cooperative
behavior develops after the key entrepreneur has established contacts with all
inventors. Obviously, the key entrepreneur has a crucial intermediate position
in the promotion of cooperative behavior.
4.2 Technical advance and regional growth
The "honeycombs" in gures 1 and 2 are associated with nancial constraints
downstream rms impose on the regional innovation system. Producers of new
technology compete for selling designs to NEs and MNEs, which commercialise
the designs. Di¢ culties with cooperative behavior occur when this chain is
broken. Accordingly, e¢ cient markets for technology are crucial, where patents
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and licences are sold to rms in one region, while investments in production
facilities sometimes are made in another region. Since technology export from
region i to region j contributes to the growth of region i, it should be discerned
and analysed separately, which is a task for future research13 .
One question arising is if there are policies to be adopted by the regional
authorities, which remove the nancial constraints on the innovation system. In
answering this question we note that - according to our approach - the number of
innovations depends on rmsexpectations about growth (cf. section 2). These
expectations vary with changes in the growth of the total market for all product
variants. That is, a zero-sum game between regions about nance for innovative
activities may be avoided by policies that stimulate macroeconomic growth. It
is not clear whether this growth e¤ect can be achieved in a decentralised way
through regional-level policies on the degree of specialisation of the regional
innovation system.
Empirical evidence suggests a positive relation between entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and growth at the regional level. Regions with high new-rm startup
rates gain from higher rates of growth (Audretsch & Keilbach 2004). Our sim-
ulations provide some insight into the interrelationships between properties of
the regional innovation system and entrepreneurial activities. To begin with, a
policy that changes the degree of specialisation (pil) seems to have no signicant
e¤ect on the growth of the total market for all product variants. We return to
this e¤ect below. This nding suggests that the success a region may have in
attracting nance to innovations through improvements of the innovation sys-
tem is achieved at the expense of other regions. Thus, the small increase in the
number of entries (in particular by NEs) when pil changes, presented in gures
3 and 4, is the outcome of competition between the regions.
13The following measure can be used as an indicator of export of technology from region
i to region j : "MNE product inventions in region i, entering in region j divided by MNE
product inventions in region i, entering in region i".
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Another result worth noting is a threshold of the innovation system. This
threshold is interesting because passing it may not only a¤ect the number of en-
tries by MNEs, but it also has an e¤ect on how MNEs assess their organisational
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capital. In addition, changes in these assessments may a¤ect macroeconomic
growth and the properties of the interregional competition for nance to support
innovations. If the conditions for cooperative behavior within an innovation sys-
tem are poor (small values of pil), improvements increase the number of entries
by NEs, while the number of entries by MNEs may fall (gures 3 and 4). Small
values of pil, with a low level of networking, imply that the capacity of the
innovation system to process information is low. Collaboration between MNEs
and regional engineers is ine¢ cient from the point of view of the MNEs. Col-
laborations by MNEs will not lead to any signicant increase in the value of the
organisational capital of the MNEs. Improvements of innovation systems with
low capacity to process local knowledge, therefore, primarily stimulate entries
by NEs.
The notion of organisational capital has been used before by Gort and Klep-
per (1982). It is associated with information on new product technology that
belongs to a rm because it has a legal right to it or it depends upon the inter-
dependent actions or information of more than one employee. Now, we hypoth-
esize that policies that improve the innovation systems beyond the threshold
portrayed in gures 3 and 4 instead lead to a revaluation of the organisational
capital, where it becomes more favorable for MNEs to invest in this type of
capital.
One implication of assessing a higher value to the organisational capital is
increased information "stickiness" (smaller values of 1):The share of the tech-
nology di¤usion between regions, which is external to the MNEs, will be reduced.
In our model, a small increase in information stickiness (-1) always reduces
the spill over between technologically advanced and lagging regions (gure 5).
The model takes into account that technology producers in lagging regions have
di¢ culties in decoding technological information coming from the technologi-
cally advanced region. Accordingly, gure 5 portrays di¤erences between large
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and small technology gaps. In the rst case, the change in technology spill
over, caused by a small change in the technology gap, is relatively small and
independent of the size of the gap. For small gaps, however, the changes in the
technology spill over become considerable when the gap changes. The changes
in the technology spill over also depend on the amount of organisational capital
held by the MNEs. The e¤ect of changes in the technology gap on the technology
spill over becomes smaller for small ratios between transferable knowledge and
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organisational capital. Figure 5 shows that the reduction in spill over will decline
with this ratio and this decline is more signicant for small technology gaps.
It is interesting to consider whether the regions can avoid zero-sum games
between one another by coordinating their policies on the specialisation of the
innovation systems with the strategies the MNEs choose for their organisational
capital. As soon as the threshold of the regional innovation system is crossed,
it becomes more attractive for MNEs to compete for advantageous positions
within the system. The organisational capital becomes more valuable and the
MNEs may respond and choose strategies to increase the organisational capital.
Overall, gure 6 conrms previously mentioned simulations suggesting that
changes in the degree of specialisation within the innovation system seem to
have a small e¤ect on the growth of the total market for all product variants.
The threshold e¤ect of the innovation system is apparent: changes in pil have no
e¤ect on the macroeconomy as long as the conditions for cooperation are poor
(small values of pil). If the threshold is crossed, however, policies on special-
isation within the innovation system improving the conditions for cooperation
among technology producers increase the growth of the total market, but this
increase diminishes and seems to disappear for large pil.
Figure 6 also shows that increased cooperation within the innovation system,
which provokes the MNEs to increase the organisational capital (reduces 1: the
technology di¤usion between the regions external to the MNEs), obstructs this
growth e¤ect. The gure also calls this type of response by the MNEs in ques-
tion. In general, MNEs prefer fast growing markets. While gure 6 shows that
the total market share increases with increases in 1 and in pil, MNEs should
have an interest in coordinating their knowledge management with infrastruc-
tural investments made by the regions to support a growing market. When
regions try to gain from improvements of the regional innovation systems, a
zero-sum game can be avoided if the MNEs choose strategies for the publica-
tion of technological information, which increases the amount of transferable
knowledge.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that simulations based on evolutionary mod-
els including vertical disintegration (production of intermediate goods) and a
geographic dimension (cooperation benets from proximity, interregional tech-
nology di¤usion) generate a rich set of predictions suited for empirical research
on regional-level technology policy and regional growth.
The topic we currently are exploring is how changes in regional innovation
systems are connected with competitive (economic) selection. Our focus is on
the technological specialisation of a region, the need of the technology producers
to protect technological secrecies and the nancial constraints on the innovation
system, which depend on the demand for innovative input by downstream rms.
For reasonable assumptions about the formation and downsizing of social and
regional networks, the simulations suggest that both protection and nance have
signicant e¤ects on the cooperative behavior by the producers of technology.
They also provide a hint for policy-makers about the importance of the key
entrepreneurial function: the major proportion of cooperative behavior develops
after the key entrepreneur has established contacts with all inventors in the
social network.
A pessimistic view of EUs Lisbon Strategy suggests that the promotion of
advanced technology will lead to a spatial evolution of European economies,
where the production of new technology with skilled and well-paid labour will
be concentrated in a small number of fast-growing regions. At the same time,
it is likely that advanced technology will di¤use across European regions with
high standards of excellence, without any contribution to poor regions (Sharp
& Pereira 2001).
As a matter of fact, this is something the EU Commission suggests. It argues
that retaining and attracting more R&D in Europe is tantamount to overcoming
the fragmentation of public research. This is achieved by letting the European
research area "structure itself along the lines of a powerful web of research
and innovation clusters" with basis in "shared principles for knowledge transfer
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and cooperation between public research and industry".14 The critical ques-
tion about how the shaping of regional innovation systems can reduce regional
imbalances and help the spatial equilibration seems to be of secondary inter-
est. In order to overcome the fragmentation, the Commission also suggests the
building of innovative capacity through integrated and networked pan-European
infrastructures.15 One result emerging from the simulations made for this paper
is that the public knowledge base and the organisational capital of the businesses
should be seen as complementary implying that improvements in the infrastruc-
tures and their connectivity can increase the value of the organisational capital.
Contrary to the purpose of the Commission to encourage the businesses to co-
operate with European research institutions, higher value of the information
about technology that belongs to the businesses can make them reluctant to
share technological knowledge.
Inspired by simulations, we call attention to the "regional conscious" devel-
opment model, discussed in the paper. It turns out that regional politicians,
who master regional innovation systems of medium conditions for cooperation,
are in a position to foster macroeconomic growth and regional balance by im-
provements of the system. A critical task of the politicians, however, is to
ensure an e¢ cient coordination of public investments in knowledge structures
and strategies for knowledge management by MNEs.
14Green Paper, The European Research Area: New Perspectives, COM(2007) 161 nal,
Commission of the European Communities, p. 8
15 ibid
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